Post-Coup Rakhine State
Kyaw Hsan Hlaing explains that Rakhine people did not join the coup resistance extensively due to deep-rooted distrust in the democratic process and Bamar-majority leadership. This distrust stems from their negative experiences with the NLD government, particularly after the 2015 elections when the NLD ignored the Rakhine National Party’s (ANP) political aspirations and appointed its own ministers in Rakhine State. Additionally, the NLD's actions during the Rohingya crisis and the extended internet shutdown in Rakhine further alienated the Rakhine population. The military's actions, including violent crackdowns and the marginalization of Rakhine leaders, exacerbated this distrust. Consequently, many Rakhine people viewed the coup as an internal conflict between the Bamar-led military and the NLD, rather than a struggle that aligned with their interests. This led to their limited participation in the nationwide resistance movement post-coup.
“After the military coup happened, Rakhine public collaborated less with the people. There were less protests in Rakhine State, and there was no CDM movement in Rakhine State.”
Host: What you say is pointing to a couple of important factors that we have to consider in Rakhine state. One is the loss of faith in the democratic process based on how the NLD responded, or the Bamar-led NLD we should say, that among many Rakhine leaders and peoples, there came a loss of faith in democratic representation, which forced them to look for other ways to guarantee their rights and their safety. That's one issue at play here. Another issue is just the building discrimination, racism, and tensions that are starting to come. I remember we had Rakhine journalist Mratt Kyaw Thu on here as a guest earlier, and he referenced that during this period, there were Bamar celebrities that were speaking up publicly and saying that those Rakhine people that did not stand for the national anthem that they should be imprisoned and killed. That was how strongly these toxic sentiments were becoming and these divisions were forming. One question I have is that, as you say powerfully that people in Rakhine started to feel that they're not a part of this state, that they're not a part of Burma, of the overall governance in the country, and that their rights and their safeties aren't guaranteed. They start to protest against that. This is an interesting thing to say, because 2015 to 2020, it brings to question who is the state that they're protesting against? Who is it that they're feeling antagonistic towards? Because, of course, the NLD is nominally in charge of the government, but as we know, the military is still holding many of the powers that the NLD has no control over and so when you were describing this antagonism and this aversion that Rakhine people start to feel towards the state, were you referring to the NLD leadership at the time or to the Bamar-led military or to both of them together?
Kyaw San Hlaing: So most of the peoples also argued that NLD didn't have power at a time when they were in "power" actually. After the military coup, most of the Burmese political experts or politician and many of people from central Burma mentioned that point. I don't agree with that, because when NLD came into power, NLD had so many things. You know, in the Rakhine conflict, NLD was involved in so many things. Even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi celebrated the military soldiers who were fighting in the Rakhine state against the Arakan army at the time in around 2019. So many things actually, and the internet shutdown. Also, we can see during the Rohinga Crisis, genocide in 2017 so all these things. They had the power, but not compared to the military, we can say but they had power. They could have something in the purpose of the people, but they didn't do that. Rakhine people saw that the NLD was only working to reconcile with military, rather than with ethnic minority groups. The NLD worked in the purpose of the military rather than ethnic organizations or ethnic political parties. This is very obvious. Another thing, the Rakhine people see that both majority Bamar-led NLD or majority Bamar-led secret military are the same at the time. They are like in twins. They came together to Rakhine and also, they fight, they work, and they collaborate in the conflict. This is what Rakhine people see at the time from 2018 to 2020. So, this is why after the military coup happened, Rakhine public probably collaborated less with the people. There were less protests in Rakhine State, and there was no CDM movement in Rakhine State. Also, we can see another fact, after NUG was founded, there was really less Rakhine people [supporting]. I can say there was not anyone who represented Rakhine people in the NUG government.