"Diplomatic Tightrope: Navigating Myanmar's Junta with Caution and Conviction"
Scot Marciel, former US Ambassador to Myanmar, joined a podcast episode to reflect on his time in the country during its democratic transition and the Rohingya crisis, highlighting the complex challenges and the need for international support. Despite optimism during the transition, Marciel acknowledges Myanmar's deep-rooted problems and, in light of the military coup, emphasizes the importance of international assistance and pressure on the regime to facilitate change. In the following excerpt, he discusses the idea of negotiating with the junta in the reality of post-coup Myanmar.
“[The military] needs to be the ones to show that this is what they want. Otherwise, it’s in my view, a waste of time. And all you do by going and seeing them in Naypyidaw legitimize them.”
“Generally, and I say this explicitly in the book, I believe in engagement, in the vast majority of circumstances. With the junta right now, though, [first], lots of people have tried to engage them, UN envoys, visitors, visiting leaders of governments in the neighborhood, Ban Ki, Moon, et cetera, with no results at all to speak of. Second, they’re waging war against their own population in the most brutal way imaginable. And so I don't see anything in their behavior that leads me to believe that they can be reasoned with. And I don't say that lightly.
So to me, I mean, look, it's up to the Myanmar people. If people in the resistance and others want to engage them, it's their country; they do whatever they think. But from an outside perspective, in terms of what the US and others might do, I think having a line or two of communication open, so that there can be conversations, if appropriate, is not necessarily a bad thing. It doesn't necessarily have to be by the US, it could be by others. Because you want to have a line or two of communication open in case things begin to change. When there's an opportunity you don't want to miss it. But I'm talking about you know, flying into Naypyidaw and going to see Min Aung Hlaing, and that that sort of thing. I think that I see no value in that at all.
To me, the military, they started this problem, with the coup and the violence. They're the aggressors. They're the ones who, ostensibly at least, hold the levers of power. And they have more firepower than the resistance. So, if they get to the point that they want to look for a way out of this, and I hope that happens, then that's the time, I think, for dialog, but they need to be the ones to show that this is what they want. Otherwise, it's in my view, a waste of time. And all you do by going and seeing them in Naypyidaw legitimize them.
Again, I think there are ways, whether it's the UN or neighboring countries or others, to have lines of communication open to them at various levels, so that if they say, ‘Hey, look, we're looking for a way out,’ you can you can follow up on that. But otherwise, sadly, I don't see any reason to be talking to these people. It should be rather, ‘What can we do to put more pressure on them?’
Most of the pressure is coming from internal forces. But put more pressure on them, so that at some point, they look for an exit strategy. Otherwise, I can't imagine, again as an outsider, I can't imagine what kind of deal could be struck between the military and the resistance. I can't even imagine it. And again, if Myanmar people think differently, it's their country, they can certainly pursue that. Absolutely. But just from my perspective, the only hope I see is for the military to be sufficiently weakened that the key elements of it look for a way out, and then there's an opportunity for engagement and dialogue.”