Episode #276: America Decides, How the US Election Could Reshape Burma Policy
We welcome you to our recent panel discussion, titled “America Decides: How the US Election Could Reshape Burma Policy.”
The 2024 U.S. election holds significant implications for American foreign policy. The decisions made by U.S. voters could shape the future of diplomatic relations, sanctions, humanitarian aid, and the support for democracy movements in Burma.
The stakes for Myanmar are very high. Given the two candidates’ different perspectives on international involvement, the transition to a new US administration will directly affect the way the country helps shape global responses to authoritarianism and human rights abuses, particularly in Myanmar.
This panel explores potential changes in policy depending on the election outcome, considering how either a Harris or Trump administration might respond to Myanmar’s political, economic, and humanitarian challenges. The discussion focuses on how U.S. leadership might engage with Myanmar’s struggle for freedom and democracy in the post-election period.
We welcome four panelists:
Scot Marciel, a seasoned U.S. diplomat, was the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar from 2016 to 2020. He now works with Stanford University and Asia-based initiatives, focusing on regional diplomacy and policy. Marciel has advocated for inclusive diplomacy and dialogue with Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, the National Unity Government (NUG), and civil society. In this discussion, he explains that a Harris administration would likely continue the current Biden administration’s focus on democracy and human rights, maintaining engagement with the NUG and ethnic groups. In contrast, he feels that a Trump administration, known for its unpredictable foreign policy, might show less interest in these issues, leaving much of the decision-making to lower-level officials. “I think a [military] defeat, whether it’s on the battlefield or a political defeat of the military, would create an opportunity for a leadership role for the U.S. Not in terms of shaping the future of Myanmar, but in organizing a major international effort on humanitarian relief, helping to rebuild the economy. That’s much more likely to happen under a Harris administration... than under a Trump administration, where it’ll be a ‘what’s in it for us’ kind of situation.” Listen to Scot Marciel’s past podcast interviews in episodes #181 and #268.
Michael Haack has spent years advocating for stronger U.S. policy towards Myanmar, including leading efforts to pass the Burma Act and secure funding for aid. Currently, he is involved in grassroots political work with the Harris campaign. Haack explains that a Harris administration would likely continue the Biden administration's targeted sanctions approach, aiming to pressure the military without harming Myanmar's civilian population. On the other hand, a Trump administration might pursue a more erratic strategy, possibly undermining international cooperation on sanctions. Haack’s comments emphasized the importance of Congress in shaping U.S. policy toward Myanmar. “I think Congress does play an outsized role in this. They’re often calling people from the State Department in front of them, both publicly and privately, to ask, 'How is Burma going? What are you doing? Are you implementing what we told you to do?' And I think that will continue no matter what administration it is.” Listen to Michael Hack’s past podcast interviews in episodes #63, #143, #208, #209a, and #256.
Yun Sun is the Director of the China program at the Stimson Center, and an expert on China-Myanmar relations. She has closely monitored the geopolitical dynamics between China and Myanmar since 2008, focusing on border security and China's influence in Myanmar. Yun Sun emphasizes that China’s priorities in Myanmar—border security, connectivity, and limiting Western influence—are relatively stable and unlikely to shift drastically regardless of who wins the U.S. election. However, a Harris administration might continue to challenge China’s growing influence in the region through diplomatic channels and by supporting democratic movements, while a Trump administration, with its transactional approach to foreign policy, might deprioritize Myanmar unless it becomes part of a broader deal with China. This exploration of China’s strategy in Myanmar shed light on the complex geopolitical dynamics at play, with China maintaining significant leverage over Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed groups, especially those near its borders. “The Myanmar problem, as everyone on this panel understands very well, is so complicated [that] it defies any singular solution. Problems overlap with problems, and they are intricate, interconnected, and intertwined. There are ethnic grievances, historical grievances, emotional factors, and territorial issues. So, I don't think there's a simple solution as saying there will be a military defeat of the Burmese military.”
Jack Myint is a non-resident fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has worked extensively on economic affairs, navigating the complexities of Myanmar's business landscape and international engagement, especially post-coup. Myint discusses how sanctions, security concerns, and the broader political crisis have severely impacted international business engagement in Myanmar. Under a Harris administration, he sees sanctions remaining as a key policy, but her approach will likely be more targeted, to avoid harming ordinary citizens. A Trump administration, however, might be more indifferent to Myanmar’s business climate, especially given Trump’s transactional focus. Myint also highlights the massive exodus of Burmese youth, which has resulted in a loss of human capital and further complications for Myanmar’s future economic recovery. “The people on the ground in Myanmar are going to determine their future, not those outside. And the people on the ground will do what they need based on their needs for survival, their needs for continuity, and the future that they want themselves and their children to live in.” Listen to Jack Myint’s past podcast interviews in episodes #174 and #203.
In the roundtable portion of the discussion, the panelists addressed the possibility of a sham election under the military junta. Marciel expressed that a Harris administration would likely approach any election orchestrated by the military with deep skepticism, recognizing that it would lack credibility and legitimacy. He noted that the Biden administration’s focus on democracy and human rights would likely continue under Harris, meaning the U.S. would not support an election that does not include meaningful participation from Myanmar’s opposition groups, including the NUG. In contrast, Marciel and other panelists raised concerns that a Trump administration might be less inclined to denounce the election, depending on how it fits into broader U.S. strategic interests in the region. However, the unpredictability of a Trump administration leaves much uncertainty around how such a scenario would be handled.
Myint added that the junta is likely to seek support from regional players, particularly China and ASEAN, to legitimize the election, which could further complicate U.S. responses. Yun Sun elaborated on how China might play a key role in shaping regional perceptions of the election, noting that if China can convince ASEAN member states to accept the results, this could pressure other countries, including the U.S., to follow suit. However, Haack emphasizes that the real determinant of the election’s impact would be how the people of Myanmar react. If the election is widely rejected by the public and resistance forces continue to fight the military regime, external validation from China or ASEAN is unlikely to stabilize the situation. In this scenario, the U.S. response, especially under a Harris administration, would likely involve continued support for the resistance and the rejection of the junta's efforts to consolidate power through a fraudulent electoral process.
The panel next explored the growing influence of Russia in Myanmar, particularly in terms of military and economic cooperation. Yun Sun points out that Russia's increasing engagement with Myanmar is part of a broader strategy to develop leverage over Western nations by supporting pariah states. She notes that Russia has been supplying arms and building military ties with the junta, especially since the 2021 coup, positioning itself as a key ally. At the same time, Sen adds that Russia's influence in Myanmar is more opportunistic than strategic, as it seeks to counterbalance its own isolation from the West, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine. For Haack and Marcel, while Russia’s involvement in Myanmar is certainly concerning, they feel that it is unlikely to become a primary focus for U.S. policymakers, who are more concentrated on countering China’s influence in the region.
Considering the implications of the upcoming US election, the panelists were in agreement that a Harris administration would likely continue working with allies to limit Russia's influence through diplomatic channels and by supporting Myanmar’s democratic movements, keeping in line with current U.S. foreign policy priorities. Conversely, a Trump administration could deprioritize Myanmar, especially considering Trump’s past positive statements about Russia and his administration’s unpredictable foreign policy strategies. The panelists agreed that while Russia’s presence in Myanmar complicates the geopolitical landscape, U.S. engagement with Myanmar remains more centered on its strategic relationship with China, with Russia playing a secondary role in influencing Myanmar’s future.
Finally, the panelists explored the potential implications of a scenario in which Myanmar’s military is decisively defeated by the resistance forces. Marciel suggests that such a development could present an opportunity for the U.S. to play a leading role in coordinating international efforts for humanitarian relief and economic reconstruction. He emphasizes that a Harris administration would likely respond by mobilizing resources to support a transition toward democratic governance, working with the NUG and ethnic armed groups to help stabilize the country. Marciel also points out that while a post-military scenario could bring short-term instability, it would likely be more conducive to long-term regional stability, as the current military regime has been a source of continued unrest and violence.
However, for Myint and Haack, it is not so straightforward. Myint believes that it’s unclear how a “military defeat by resistance forces” would be defined. In other words, to what degree would the military need to be degraded? Moreover, the term “resistance” can be misleading since it is not a monolithic entity, and includes ethnic armed groups with differing political and military agendas. He warns that even if the Myanmar military were defeated, internal conflicts among ethnic groups and factions could lead to further instability. Haack echoes these concerns, noting that the U.S. would face significant challenges in navigating this fragmented landscape, particularly if different regions or ethnic groups assert their own authority. He added that while a military defeat could open the door for U.S. engagement, the nature of the post-military power structure would heavily influence how the U.S. and the international community would interact with the new leadership.